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Abstract—In a Cross-Origin State Inference (COSI) attack,
an attacker convinces a victim into visiting an attack web
page, which leverages the cross-origin interaction features of
the victim’s web browser to infer the victim’s state at a target
web site. COSI attacks can have serious consequences including
determining if the victim has an account or is the administrator of
a prohibited target site, determining if the victim owns sensitive
content or is the owner of a specific account at the target site.
While COSI attacks are not new, they have previously been
considered as sparse attacks under different names. This paper is
the first to systematically study COSI attacks as a comprehensive
category and to present a tool for detecting COSI attacks. We
introduce the concept of a COSI attack class to capture related
attack variants and identify 39 COSI attack classes, of which 22
are new, and the rest generalize existing attacks. We discover a
novel XS-Leak based on window.postMessage. We design a novel
approach to detect COSI attacks, and implement it into Basta-
COSI, a tool that produces attack web pages that demonstrate
the existence of COSI attacks in a target web site. We apply
Basta-COSI to four popular stand-alone web applications and
six popular live sites, finding COSI attacks against each of them.
Finally, we discuss defenses against COSI attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a Cross-Origin State Inference (COSI) attack, the at-
tacker’s goal is to determine the state of a victim visiting an
attack page (e.g., attack.com/index.html), in a target web site
that is not controlled by the attacker (e.g., linkedin.com). The
state of a user in a target web site is defined by login status,
account, and content properties. For example, the user may be
logged into the site; have a normal, premium, administrator,
or restricted (e.g., for under-age users) account; or be the
owner of some content hosted at the site. The state of a
user determines what content and functionality the user may
access in the target web site. For example, users that are not
logged in can only access public content, normal users cannot
access premium functionality, and uploaded content can only
be edited or removed by its owner.
Determining the state of a victim in a target web site can
have important security implications. For example, determin-
ing that a victim is logged into a target web site implies that
the victim owns an account in that site. This is problematic for
privacy-sensitive web sites such as those related to post-marital
affairs and pornography. Determining content ownership can
be used to establish if a program committee member is re-
viewing a specific paper in a conference management system,
or if the victim has uploaded some copyrighted content to
an anonymous file sharing site. Deanonymizing the account
owner, i.e., determining if a victim owns a specific account,
enables identifying which company employee runs an anony-
mous blog criticizing the company’s management. Such state
inferences are even more critical when the attacker is a nation
state that performs censorship and can determine if the victim
has an account in, or is the administrator of, some prohibited
web site. The problem is aggravated by COSI attacks being
web attacks, which can be performed even when the victim
employs anonymization tools such as a virtual private network.
COSI attacks are a type of cross-origin browser side-
channels. The attacker convinces the victim to visit an attack
page. The attack page includes at least one state-dependent
URL (SD-URL) from the target web site, whose response
depends on the state of the visitor. For example, a SD-
URL may point to some content in the target web site only
accessible when the victim has a specific state such as being
authenticated and owning the content. The inclusion forces the
victim’s browser to send a cross-origin request to the target
web site. Since the request is cross-origin, the same-origin
policy (SOP) prevents the attack page from directly reading
the response. However, the attacker can leverage a browser
leak method (or XS-Leak) in the browser to infer, from the
cross-origin response, the victim’s state at the target web site.
Multiple instances of COSI attacks have been found in the
last 13 years by both security analysts (e.g., [22], [23], [29],
[32], [36], [46]) and academics (e.g., [17], [27], [34], [58]),
with roughly half of them being presented in the last four
years, and several already in 2019 (e.g., [50], [55]). However,
they have previously been considered as sparse attacks under
different names such as login detection attacks [30], [31], [46],
login oracle attacks [45], [51], cross-site search attacks [27],
URL status identification attacks [42], and cross-site frame
leakage attacks [50]. Unfortunately, those attack instances have
not been generalized. Thus, many are variants of each other,
with many other variants remaining unknown. As far as we
know, we are the first to systematically study these attacks and
group them under the same COSI attack denomination. We
introduce the concept of a COSI attack class, which defines
the SD-URLs that can be attacked using a specific XS-Leak,
the affected browsers, and the set of inclusion methods (i.e.,
HTML tags and DOM methods) that can be used to include
the SD-URL in the attack page. Our study identifies 39 COSI
attack classes, of which 22 are new and the rest generalize
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
02
20
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  6
 A
ug
 20
19
prior attacks, covering many new attack variants. We identify
a novel XS-Leak based on window.postMessage, which affects
popular sites such as blogger.com, ebay.com, reddit.com, and
youtube.com. We also discuss existing and upcoming defenses
against COSI attacks.
We design a novel approach to detect COSI attacks based on
our attack classes. Such detection is currently a painful manual
task. This is problematic as finding COSI attacks requires an
exhaustive exploration of both the target web site and XS-
Leaks, a task poorly suited for manual analysis. We implement
our approach into Basta-COSI, the first tool to detect COSI
attacks. Given as input a target web site and state scripts
defining the user states at the target web site, Basta-COSI
identifies SD-URLs in the target web site, tests if those SD-
URLs can be attacked using any of the 39 attack classes, and
produces attack pages that combine multiple attack vectors
to demonstrate the existence of COSI attacks to distinguish
different states.
We have applied Basta-COSI to test 10 targets: four popular
stand-alone web applications (HotCRP, GitLab, GitHub, and
OpenCart) and six popular live sites (amazon.com, blogge
r.com, drive.google.com, linkedin.com, pinterest.com, and
pornhub.com). Basta-COSI discovers COSI attacks against all
of them with no false positives. The discovered attacks include
deanonymization attacks for determining if the victim is the
reviewer of a paper in HotCRP, owns a blog in blogger.com,
an account in pornhub.com, or a GitLab/GitHub repository.
In addition, login detection attacks are found in all 10 targets,
account type detection attacks in three, and an access detection
attack in one. Attacks have been disclosed to the affected web
applications, websites, and browser vendors.
The following are the main contributions of this paper:
• We perform the first systematic study of COSI attacks.
We present COSI attacks as a comprehensive category
and introduce the concept of a COSI attack class to
capture related attack variants. We identify 39 attack
classes, of which 22 are new and the rest generalize prior
attacks.
• We discover a novel XS-Leak based on
window.postMessage that affects the three major
browsers and can be leveraged to attack popular web
sites.
• We design and implement Basta-COSI, the first tool for
detecting COSI attacks. Given as input a target web site
and state scripts defining the states at the target web site,
Basta-COSI detects SD-URLs, identifies those that can be
attacked with any of the 39 attack classes, and generates
attack pages that demonstrate the attacks.
• We apply Basta-COSI to four popular stand-alone web
applications and six popular live sites, finding COSI
attacks against all of them. The attacks found enable
login detection, account deanonymization, account type
inference, and access detection.
• We will publicly release Basta-COSI as part of a larger
open-source framework for testing cloud-based applica-
tions [3].
State Attribute Possible Values
Login Status (a) Logged in
(b) Not logged in
Single Sign-On Status (a) Logs in via a specific SSO service
(b) Logs in via another SSO service
Session Status (a) Has an established session
(b) Has not an established session
Account Type (a) Has a premium account
(b) Has a regular account
Account Age Category (a) Age above a certain threshold
(b) Age below a certain threshold
Account Ownership (a) Owner of a specific account
(b) Not the owner of an account
Content Ownership (a) Owner of a specific content
(b) Not the owner of a content
TABLE I: Examples of user states in a target web site.
II. OVERVIEW
This Section provides an overview of COSI attacks. Sec-
tion II-A details the user state at a target web site. Sec-
tion II-B describes the two phases of a COSI attack. Finally,
Section II-C presents the COSI attack threat model.
A. User State
Most web sites have accounts owned by a user and identified
by a username. In this paper a user is a person who visits a
target web site and may or may not own an account in that
site; it should not be confused with a username that identifies
an account. Accounts are often anonymous, i.e., the person
that owns the account is unknown. Deanonymizing an account
means linking its username to the person owning the account.
Web sites that do not have accounts often define sessions to
identify users that visit them repeatedly. In those sites a session
acts as an account for our purposes.
In a COSI attack, the attacker’s goal is to infer the state of a
victim user with respect to a target web site, not controlled by
the attacker. The state of a user at a target web site is defined
by the values of status, account, and ownership state attributes.
Example state attributes are provided in Table I. The values
of those state attributes define, at a given time, what content
the user can access (or receives) from the target site. Status
attributes include whether the user is logged in, logged out,
logged in using a specific single sign-on (SSO) service, or
has an ongoing session (i.e., in sites without user accounts).
Account attributes include the account type (e.g., regular,
premium, administrator), the account age category (e.g., under-
age user with restricted access). Ownership attributes include
whether the user is the owner of some specific account and
whether he/she owns some content stored in the site (e.g., a
PDF paper in a conference management system).
The attributes that define the user’s state are specific to
each target site. Any of those attributes may be targeted by
an attacker with different, often critical, security implications.
For example, COSI attacks targeting the login status can be
used by an oppressive regime to determine if the victim is
logged in (and thus owns an account) in a censored site [18],
despite the victim using a VPN. They can also be used to
blackmail users owning accounts in privacy-sensitive sites
such as those related to pornography [20] and post-marital
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affairs [35]. Furthermore, they may be used as an initial step
for Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [16] or Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) [44] attacks. Attacks on session status have
similar implications than those on login status for sites without
user accounts. For example, they could be used to determine
if a user previously visited a forbidden news site.
COSI attacks targeting ownership are also highly impactful.
Content ownership can be used to determine if a program
committee member is reviewing a specific paper, or if a user
has uploaded some copyrighted content to an anonymous file
sharing site. Account ownership can be used for deanonymiz-
ing the account in a closed-world setting, i.e., determining
which of n known persons owns a specific account. Such
closed-world deanonymization can be used to determine which
company employee is the owner of an anonymous blog highly
critical with the company’s management.
Attacks that target account type, account age category, and
login status can be used to fingerprint the victim [9], [37],
and applied for targeted advertising by a malicious publisher
in an open-world setting (where the set of users is unknown).
Finally, knowledge of the SSO service used by the victim can
be used to exploit a vulnerability in that SSO [12], [13], [60].
State scripts. In this work, we capture states at a target
site using state scripts that can be executed to automatically
log into the target site using a configurable browser and the
credentials of a specific account with a unique configuration.
For example, we may create multiple user accounts with
different configurations, e.g., premium and free accounts, two
users that own different blogs, or authors that have submitted
different papers to a conference management system. We also
create a state script for the logged out state.
B. COSI Attack Overview
In a COSI attack, the attacker convinces a victim to visit
an attack page. The attack page leverages the cross-origin
functionalities of the victim’s web browser to infer the victim’s
state at a target web site. A COSI attack comprises of two
phases: preparation and attack.
Preparation. The goal of the preparation phase is to create an
attack page that when visited by a victim will leak the victim’s
state at the target web site. An attack page implements at
least one, possibly more, attack vectors. Each attack vector
is a triplet of a state-dependent URL from the target web
site, an inclusion method to embed the SD-URL in the attack
page, and an attack class that defines, among others, a leak
method (or XS-Leak) that interacts with the victim’s browser
to disclose a victim’s state at the target site. An attack page
may contain multiple attack vectors. For example, it may need
to chain attack vectors to uniquely distinguish a state, e.g., one
to identify if the victim is logged in, and another to identify
if a logged victim has a premium account.
We say that a URL is state-dependent if, when requested
through HTTP(S), it returns different responses depending on
the state it is visited from. Note that it is not needed that each
state returns a different response. For example, if there are
6 states and two different responses, each for three states,
the URL is still state-dependent. The SD-URL is included
by the attack page using an inclusion method such as an
HTML tag (e.g., img, script) or a browser DOM method
(e.g., window.open). When the attack page is visited by the
victim, the inclusion method forces the victim’s browser to
automatically request the SD-URL from the target site. The
specific response received depends on the victim’s current
state. SD-URLs are very common in web applications. For
example, in many web applications, sending a request for a
profile’s picture will return an image if the user is logged in,
but will return an error page, or a redirection to the login page,
if not logged in. Similarly, in a blog application, a new post
can only be added if the user is both logged in and the owner
of the blog.
The request induced by the attack page for a SD-URL
at the target site is cross-origin, and thus controlled by
the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) [65]. The SOP prevents the
attack page from directly reading the contents of a cross-
origin response [14]. However, there exist XS-Leaks that allow
bypassing a browser’s SOP to disclose information about
cross-origin responses. For example, the EventsFired XS-Leak
distinguishes responses to SD-URLs that trigger a callback in
one state (e.g., onload) and another callback (e.g., onerror),
or no callback, in another state.
While a target site may contain many SD-URLs, only a
subset of those may be useful to mount a COSI attack. One
main challenge with XS-Leaks is that they are specific to
certain types of SD-URLs and certain browsers. Unfortunately,
this key concept is missing from prior works presenting COSI
attacks, which thus do not provide this information. In this
work, we introduce the concept of a COSI attack class,
which defines the two different responses to a SD-URL that
can be distinguished using a XS-Leak, the possible inclusion
methods that can be used in conjunction with the XS-Leak,
and the browsers affected. Section III describes our approach
to identify attack classes and the 39 COSI attack classes we
have found.
Based on the attack classes, we propose a novel approach to
detect COSI attacks. Our approach first collects the responses
to the same URL from different states. SD-URLs will be the
ones that produce different responses in some states. Each pair
of different responses coming from distinct states is matched
with the list of known attack classes. If a matching attack
class is found, then an attack vector can be built to distinguish
the responses (and thus the states that produce them) that
uses that SD-URL, the XS-Leak in the attack class, and one
of the inclusion methods defined by the attack class. Since
there may be n > 2 states that need to be distinguished, the
process repeats until sufficient attack vectors are identified to
uniquely distinguish the target state to be attacked. We have
implemented this approach into Basta-COSI, the first tool to
detect COSI attacks, detailed in Section IV.
Attack. In the attack phase, the attacker convinces the victim
into visiting the attack page. This can be achieved in multiple
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Listing 1: A simple login detection attack page
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html>
3 <body>
4 <script src="jquery.min.js"></script>
5 <script>
6 $(document).ready(function() {
7 //Checking if "naturalHeight" property is set
8 if ($("#incl").prop("naturalHeight")){
9 //Sending leaked user state to attacker
10 $.post("attackServer.php","Logged in");
11 }
12 else{
13 //Sending leaked user state to attacker
14 $.post("attackServer.php","Not logged in");
15 }
16 });
17 </script>
18 <!-- SD-URL inclusion -->
19 <img id="incl" src="https://target.com/
profile.jpg">
20 </body>
21 </html>
ways. One possibility is sending an email with the attack
page URL and some text to convince the victim to click on
it. Another possibility is a watering-hole approach where the
attacker injects the attack page URL into a vulnerable page
that the victim is likely to visit. The method used to convince
the victim to visit the attack page is outside the scope of this
paper.
When the attack page is loaded at the victim’s browser, it
first checks the browser used by the victim and then delivers
attack vectors suitable for that browser. Once the victim’s state
is leaked, the attack page reports it back to the attack site.
Example attack page. Listing 1 shows a simple attack page
that allows the attacker to identify if the visiting victim is
logged into the target.com site. This attack page contains a
single attack vector where the SD-URL is a profile’s picture
hosted at target.com/profile.jpg, the inclusion method is
the img tag, and the XS-Leak uses the naturalHeight
property of the included image object. When the victim visits
this attack page, the img tag in line 19 automatically generates
a cross-origin request to the target site for the victim’s profile
image. If the victim is logged into the target site, the profile
image is successfully returned and the value of the natu-
ralHeight property will be set. Instead, if the victim is not
logged in, the target site returns an error page and the value of
the naturalHeight property is not set (line 8). Based on
the returned value, the attack page reports back to the attack
site whether the victim is logged into the target site (lines
10, 14). Note that this simple attack page does not check the
victim’s browser as the used attack vector works in the major
browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge).
C. Threat Model
This section describes the COSI attack threat model, detail-
ing the assumptions we make about each actor.
Attacker. We assume that the attacker can trick victims into
loading the attack page on their web browsers. During prepara-
tion, the attacker has the ability to create and manage different
accounts at the target web site, or in a local installation of the
target’s web application. The attacker controls an attack web
site where he/she can add arbitrary pages. Finally, we assume
the attacker can identify the victim’s browser version (e.g.,
from the User-Agent header) to select the right attack vector.
Victim. The victim uses a fully up-to-date web browser and
can be lured by the attacker into visiting the attack webpage.
We assume that the victim logs into the target web site with
the same web browser used to visit the attack page.
Target site. The target site contains at least one SD-URL
for which the attacker knows an attack class. The target site
does not suffer from any known vulnerabilities. In particular,
resources containing sensitive information are protected from
direct cross-origin reads, i.e., the target site does not contain
CORS misconfigurations [43] or critical cross-site script in-
clusion vulnerabilities [45].
III. COSI ATTACK CLASSES
This work introduces COSI attack classes, which group
similar attack instances with the same underlying cause, poten-
tially capturing many unknown variants. A COSI attack class
is a 6-tuple that comprises of a class name, signatures for two
groups of responses that can be distinguished using the attack
class, an XS-Leak, a list of inclusion methods that can be
used to embed the SD-URL in an attack page, and the list of
affected browsers. An attack class captures the SD-URLs that
can be used for building an attack vector against the affected
browsers using the XS-Leak and one of the inclusion methods
defined. This section first presents our approach to discover
COSI attack classes in Section III-A and then details the 39
attack classes identified in Section III-B
A. Discovering Attack Classes
Our process to discover COSI attack classes comprises of
three main steps: (1) identify and validate previously proposed
COSI attack instances; (2) generalize known COSI attack
instances into COSI attack classes; and (3) discover previously
unknown attack classes.
Identifying attack instances. We performed a survey of COSI
attack instances presented in prior work. This is the first work
to present COSI attacks as a unique category of web attacks.
Thus, we could not simply search for entries referencing COSI
attacks, making it a laborious process. Our survey identified 20
prior works, listed in Table VII and described in Section VII.
Out of those, 11 are blog posts, 7 are academic papers, one
is a bug report, and the last one is a recent project that
tries to enumerate all known DOM APIs that leak cross-
origin information [59]. This project was created in February
2019 when we had already been performing this work for
months, and covers only a subset of the attack classes we
have identified. Those 20 prior works presented 31 attack
instances. All attack instances could be validated in at least
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Tag Attribute Included Resource’s Type
applet code Applet
audio src Audio
embed src Defined in type attribute
frame src Typically web pages
iframe src Typically web pages
img src Image
input src Image (when attr. type = “picture”)
link href Defined in rel and type attributes
object data Defined in type attribute
script src JS
source src Audio/Video
track src WebVTT [7]
video poster Image
video src Video
TABLE II: HTML tags supporting resource inclusion.
one recent browser version. To validate an attack instance
we manually create a test attack page based on the available
information. The test attack page includes a URL from a test
application we have designed to return custom responses to
an incoming request. Requests to the test application define
how the response should look (i.e., which headers and body
to return). For validation, we configured our test application to
return the same responses described in the previous work. This
allowed us to validate attack instances even when a SD-URL
in the target site was no longer active.
Generalizing instances into classes. Generalizing a COSI
attack instance into a COSI attack class comprises of two
steps. First, identifying the set of responses to the inclusion
method that still trigger the same observable difference in
the browser (e.g., onload/onerror or different object property
values). Then, checking if the observable difference still
manifests with other inclusion methods and browsers. The
generalization uses the test application to control the response
received from a potential target site. We illustrate it using
an attack instance of the EF-StatusErrorObject attack class.
The generalization starts with the response that triggers the
onload callback and tries to modify each response element
(header or body) to a different value. If the modification still
triggers the onload callback, then the element can be ignored.
In our example, all fields can be ignored, except the status
code that it should be 200 and the content-type that should
not correspond to an audio or video. The generalization then
repeats for the response that triggers the onerror callback,
returning that the status code should not be success (200) or
redirection (3xx), but other values for the status code, headers,
and body do not matter. Once the responses are generalized,
it tests whether other inclusions methods still trigger the same
observable difference. For this, it tests the 13 tags in the
HTML specification that enable resource inclusion without
user intervention and the window.open() method. These tags
are shown in Table II. Finally, it checks if the leak manifests in
other browsers. Table VII shows that the 31 attack instances
examined belonged to 15 attack classes. We found up to 5
attack instances in the same attack class.
Discovering new attack classes. The test application allows
systematically exploring combinations of header and body
values in responses. For each response, browser events and
DOM values are logged. Then, pairs of responses that produce
observable differences (e.g., trigger different callbacks), and
do not match existing attack classes, are selected as attack
instances, and generalized as above. Overall, we discovered
22 new attack classes, of which 11 use the EventsFired
(i.e., onload/onerror) XS-Leak, 8 use the Object Property
XS-Leak, and 1 uses a completely novel XS-Leak based on
postMessages. The 39 attack classes are detailed in Table III
and described in the next section.
B. Attack Classes Description
Table III details the 39 attack classes identified by the
above process. For each attack class, the table shows the
name we assigned to the class; a description of the two
different responses by a SD-URL that can be targeted using
this attack class; the attack page logic with the methods that
can be used to include the SD-URL and the XS-Leak to
distinguish the responses; and the affected browsers. In each
response description we abbreviate HTTP fields as follows:
Status Code (sc), Content-Type (ct), X-Content-Type-Options
(xcto), Content-Disposition (cd), and response body (bdy).
EventsFired. The first 19 attack classes use the events fired in
the browser as XS-Leak and hence are denoted by the prefix
EF-. The first attack class EF-StatusErrorScript can target SD-
URLs that return in one state a success status code (sc = 200)
with JavaScript (JS) content (ct = text/javascript), and
return an error (sc = (4xxOR 5xx)) in another state. The
events fired by both types of responses are different (onload
in one case, onerror in the other) allowing to distinguish
the two responses. This attack class works on all browsers.
Among these 19 attack classes, 13 are new and for the other 6
attack instances had been previously proposed. Most of these
19 involve the type or disposition of the content, including
content-sniffing (X-Content-Type-Options). There are
also cases related to the X-Frame-Options header.
Object Properties. The next 13 attack classes leverage as
XS-Leak the readable properties of the included resource.
Out of these 13, 8 are new attack classes, while the rest
have been generalized to define the SD-URLs affected, in-
clude more properties, and add new inclusion methods. For
instance, in OP-ImgDimension, if a SD-URL returns images
with different dimensions, the height and width properties
allow to differentiate the responses. While this class was
known to create a leak with those two properties [59], our
approach uncovers that the same attack can be applied as
well using the naturalHeight and naturalWidth properties.
Interestingly, OP-ImgCtMismatch presents a similar attack
targeting SD-URLs that return an image and a non-image,
which works because for non-image resources some browsers
return the height and width of a broken image icon, triggering
a difference in dimensions. The term (form, iframe) in OP-
FrameCount,OP-WindowProperties captures that it is possible
to also include the resource using a form tag, to trigger a
POST request, and embedding the response in an iframe [23].
All other attack classes leverage GET requests.
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Class SD-URL Responses Attack Page’s Logic Browsers
Response A Response B Inclusion Methods Leak Method Firefox Chrome Edge
EF-StatusErrorScript sc = 200, ct = text/javascript sc = (4xx OR 5xx) script src=URL [onload] / [onerror] X X X
EF-StatusErrorObject sc = 200, ct 6= (audio OR video) sc 6= (200 OR 3xx) object data=URL [onload] / [onerror] X 7 7
EF-StatusErrorEmbed sc = 401, ct = (text/html) sc 6= 401, ct = (text/html) embed src=URL [] / [onload] 7 7 X
EF-StatusErrorLink sc = (200 OR 3xx), ct 6= text/html sc 6= (200 OR 3xx) link href=URL rel=prefetch [onload] / [onerror] 7 X 7
EF-StatusErrorLinkCss sc = (200 OR 3xx), ct = text/css sc 6= (200 OR 3xx), ct 6= text/css link href=URL rel=stylesheet [onload] / [onerror] X X 7
EF-RedirStatLink sc = 3xx sc 6= 3xx, cto = nosniff, ct 6= (text/css
OR text/html)
link href=URL rel=stylesheet [onload] / [onerror] 7 X 7
EF-StatusErrorIFrame sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx or 5xx), ct=
(text/javascript OR text/css)
sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx or 5xx), ct 6=
(text/javascript OR text/css)
iframe src=URL [] / [onload] 7 7 X
EF-NonStdStatusErrorIFrame sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx or 5xx), ct =
(text/javascript OR text/css)
sc = 999 iframe src=URL [] / [onload] 7 7 X
EF-CDispIFrame sc = 200, cd = attachment cd 6= attachment iframe src=URL [] / [onload] 7 X 7
EF-CDispStatErrIFrame sc = (4xx OR 5xx), cd = attachment sc = (4xx OR 5xx), cd 6= attachment iframe src=URL [] / [onload] X 7 7
EF-CDispAthmntIFrame sc = 200, cd = attachment ¬(sc = 200, cd = attachment) iframe src=URL [] / [onload] 7 X 7
EF-XctoScript sc = 200, xcto disabled, ct = (text/html OR
text/css OR application/pdf)
sc = 200, xcto = nosniff, ct = (text/html
OR text/css OR application/pdf)
script src=URL [onload] / [onerror] X 7 X
EF-CtMismatchObject sc = 200, ct = X sc = 200, ct = Y object data=URL
typesmustmatch type=X
[onload] / [onerror] X 7 7
EF-CtMismatchScript sc = 200, ct = (text/javascript) sc = 200, xcto = nosniff, ct 6= (text/-
javascript)
script src=URL [onload] / [onerror] X 7 X
EF-CtMismatchImg sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), ct =
image
sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), ct
6= image
img src=URL [onload] / [onerror] 7 X X
EF-CtMismatchAudio sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), ct =
audio
sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), ct
6= audio
audio src=URL ¬[onerror OR on-
suspend] / [onerror
OR onsuspend]
7 X 7
EF-CtMismatchVideo sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), ct =
video
sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), ct
6= video
video src=URL ¬[onerror OR on-
suspend] / [onerror
OR onsuspend]
X 7 7
EF-XfoObject sc = 200, xcto = text/*, xfo is disabled sc = 200, xfo is enabled object data=URL [] / [onload] 7 X 7
EF-CacheLoadCheck bdy = includes URL A bdy = does not include URL A Error req to
URL A, link
rel=preload
href=URL, img
src=URL A, error
req to URL A
[onload]/[onerror] X X X
OP-LinkSheet sc = 200, ct = text/css, bdy = CSS-like sc = 200, ct 6= text/css, bdy 6= CSS-like link rel=stylesheet href=URL sheet 7 7 X
OP-LinkSheetStatusError sc = (200 OR 3xx), ct 6= text/css sc 6= (200 OR 3xx) link rel=stylesheet href=URL sheet 7 7 X
OP-ImgDimension sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), ct =
image, bdy = image with dimension A
sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), ct =
image, bdy = image with dimension B
img src=URL height, width, nat-
uralHeight, natural-
Width
X X X
OP-VideoDimension sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), bdy
= video with dimension A
sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), body
= (video with dimension B OR body not
video)
video src=URL videoHeight,
videoWidth
X X X
OP-WindowDimension sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), bdy
= PDF
sc = (200 OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), body
6= PDF
frame src=URL height, width 7 7 X
OP-MediaDuration sc = 200, ct = (audio or video), bdy =
audio/video with duration A
sc = 200, ct = (audio OR video), bdy =
audio/video with duration B
audio/video
src=URL
duration X X X
OP-ImgCtMismatch sc = 2xx, ct = image sc = 4xx, ct 6= image img src=URL height, width, nat-
uralHeight, natural-
Width
X 7 X
OP-MediaCtMismatch sc = 200, ct = (audio OR video) ct 6= (audio OR video) audio/video src=URL networkState,
readyState, buffered,
paused, duration,
seekable
X X X
OP-FrameCount sc = 200, ct = text/html, bdy = HTML
with numFrames A
sc = 200, ct = text/html, xfo is disabled,
bdy = HTML with numFrames B
iframe src=URL, (form, iframe) contentWindow.length X X X
OP-MediaStatus sc = 2xx, ct = (audio OR video) sc = 4xx OR 5xx ct 6= (audio OR video) video/audio src=URL error.message X 7 7
OP-XfoObject sc = 200, xfo is disabled, ct = text/* sc = 200, xfo is enabled object data=URL contentDocument X 7 7
OP-XfoIFrame xfo is disabled sc = (2xx OR 3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx), xfo
is enabled
iframe src=URL contentDocument X 7 7
OP-WindowProperties sc = 200, ct = text/html, bdy = HTML
with window property A
sc = 200, ct = text/html, bdy = HTML
with window property B
window.open(), (form,
iframe)
frames.length X X X
postMessage bdy = postmsg A broadcast bdy = (postmsg B broadcast OR no
postmsgs broadcast)
iframe, window.open() receiveMessage() X X X
CSSPropRead sc = 200, ct = text/css, bdy = CSS with
rule A
sc = 200, ct = text/css, bdy = CSS with
rule B
link rel=stylesheet href=URL window.getComputedStyle() X X X
JSError sc = 200, ct = text/javascript, bdy = JS
with A no. of errors
sc = 200, ct = text/javascript, bdy = JS
with B no. of errors
script src=URL window.onerror() X X X
JSObjectRead sc = 200, ct = text/javascript, bdy = JS
with readable object A
sc = 200, ct = text/javascript, bdy = JS
with readable object B
script src=URL window.hasOwnProperty(),
prototype tampering,
global API
redefinition
X X X
CSPViolation sc = 3xx, Location = same origin sc = 3xx, Location = different origin iframe, frame, embed, applet,
video, audio, object, link,
script
{“csp- report”:} X X X
AppCacheError sc = 200 sc = (3xx OR 4xx OR 5xx) html
manifest=MANIFEST.appcache
AppCache error 7 X 7
Timing Load/Resp./Parse time A Load/Resp./Parse time B script, video, img,
...
timing side-channel X X X
TABLE III: COSI attack classes.
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PostMessage. This class uses a novel XS-Leak that as far
as we know has not been previously mentioned. It can target
SD-URLs that return different broadcasted postMessages, or a
broadcast postMessage and no broadcast. It affects all three
browsers. To read the postMessages, the attack page can
include the SD-URL using the iframe tag, if the page does not
use framing protection, or the window.open method if framing
protection is used. To identify a difference between responses
it compares the number of broadcast messages, the message
origins, and the message content. The message content is
compared using the Jaro string distance [40] to account for
small session-specific or user-specific differences.
CSSPropRead. Another XS-Leak leverages SD-URLs that
return different CSS rules for different states. To identify the
differences, the attack page is designed to contain elements
affected by the differing rules and to check the inherited style
rules. Some attack instances in this class were previously
known [22], [31]. This class complements the OP-LinkSheet
and OP-LinkSheetStatusError classes, which can differentiate
between CSS and non-CSS responses.
JSError. When a SD-URL returns different JavaScript files,
where one contains a JS error and the other does not, this
difference can be detected using the window.onerror() callback
function. The original attack instance used window.onerror()
to read the line number and the type of JS error triggered [29].
But, since Cross-Site Script Inclusion (XSSI) attacks [28], [57]
abused the verbosity of window.onerror(), popular browsers
no longer return the error line. However, we find the attack
still works by comparing the number of errors triggered.
This class complements EF-StatusErrorIFrame, which allows
differentiating JS and non-JS responses.
JSObjectRead. Another XS-Leak for differentiating re-
sponses that contain JS files checks the presence or absence of
certain readable objects in the included JS. The original attack
instance checked for global variables [28], but later attacks
also leveraged techniques such as prototype tampering and
global API redefinition [45].
CSPViolation. When a SD-URL redirects visitors to the same
origin in a state and to a different origin in another state, this
difference can be detected using a Content Security Policy
(CSP). The attacker configures its attack site with a CSP
policy for the attack page that states that any attempt to load
a resource from an origin different than the attack site should
send a violation report back to the attack site. This method
was originally proposed for leaking sensitive information in
the CSP report (e.g. in the path and subdomain) [36]. Browsers
then removed the path information from CSP reports, but the
attack still works by focusing on whether the CSP violation
report is received (redirection to different origin) or not
(redirection to same origin).
AppCacheError. When a SD-URL returns a success status
code (2xx) in one state and a redirection (3xx) or error (4xx,
5xx) in another, this difference can be detected through the
browser’s AppCache [8]. The attack page uses the manifest
attribute of the html tag to refer to an AppCache manifest file,
which includes the SD-URL in the list of URLs that should
be cached. This forces the browser to request the SD-URL.
If the SD-URL returns a success status code, an AppCache
cached event is triggered. If the SD-URL returns a redirection
or error, an AppCache error event is triggered instead. Lee
et al. [42] first presented this attack showing that it affected
five browsers. However, this XS-Leak currently only works
in Chromium-based browsers because Firefox and Edge no
longer allow cross-origin URLs to be cached using AppCache.
Timing. Multiple works have shown that timing differences
when a resource is loaded from different states can be used
to distinguish those states [17], [23], [27], [58]. The main
challenge with this attack class is that it requires accurate
timing information and is subject to network conditions. Thus,
these works have compared different approaches to calculate
load, response, and parsing times.
IV. BASTA-COSI
We have designed and implemented Basta-COSI, a tool
for assisting a security analyst in identifying, and generating
evidence of, COSI attacks in a target site. Basta-COSI focuses
on the COSI attack preparation phase. It takes as input a
target site, a set of state scripts defining states in the target
site, and the attack classed identified in Section III. It outputs
attack pages, which can be used by a security analyst for
demonstrating the existence of COSI attacks to the developer
of the web application or the administrator of a site that
deploys the application.
Setup. Basta-COSI needs to have network access to the
target site. This may be a local installation of the target
web application if its source code is available (e.g., GitLab,
HotCRP) or the final target web site otherwise (e.g., LinkedIn,
Facebook). The analyst needs to be able to create user accounts
in the target site. Those accounts should cover different
account types and should be populated with content, e.g.,
filling the user profile, creating a blog, and adding blog entries.
For example, to test the open source HotCRP conference
management system, the analyst prepares a local installation
by creating a test conference and four user accounts: two
authors, and two reviewers. Then, he/she submits a paper
using each of the author accounts. Finally, it assigns the paper
submitted by the first author to the first reviewer and the paper
submitted by the second author to the second reviewer.
Once the target site is configured, the analyst creates state
scripts that can be executed to automatically load a specific
state at a web browser. i.e., to log into the tested web
application using one of the created accounts or to log out
of an account. Basta-COSI currently supports state scripts
written using the Python Selenium WebDriver [5]. The web
browser to be used is an argument to the state script. In our
HotCRP example, the analyst creates five state scripts. The
first four scripts open a web browser, visit the login page, and
authenticate using one of the four created accounts. The last
script logs in and then logs out to capture the logged out state.
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Fig. 1: Basta-COSI architecture.
Architecture. The architecture of Basta-COSI is shown in
Figure 1. It takes as input the state scripts, a set of browsers,
the configured target site, and a target state. It outputs an attack
page that enables leaking if a victim is in the target state at
the target site. Basta-COSI comprises of three modules: URL
data collection, attack vector identification, and attack page
generation.
The URL data collection module crawls the target site to
discover URLs. It visits each discovered URL to collect its
response when visited from a specific state with a specific
browser. And, it compares the responses to the same URL
obtained from different states to identify SD-URLs that may
be candidates to be used in attack pages.
Next, the attack vector identification checks if any of the
SD-URLs can be attacked using the known COSI attack
classes. When needed, it visits each SD-URL using a set of
inclusion vectors to collect browser events that can only be
obtained with a specific inclusion method (e.g., postMessages),
or that cannot be easily obtained statically from the HTTP(S)
responses (e.g., JS errors, readable JS objects). For each SD-
URL that matches an attack class, it outputs an attack vector.
Finally, the attack page generation module builds an attack
page that enables identifying if the victim is in the target state
at the target site. The generated attack page may combine
multiple attack vectors. For example, it may combine a login
detection vector with another vector for distinguishing a spe-
cific account type,and it may include different attack vectors
for each browser. Attack pages for different target states can
be created by re-running the attack page generation module,
without re-running the previous modules.
A. URL Data Collection
The URL data collection module performs three main tasks:
crawling to discover URLs, collecting the responses for each
URL when visited from a specific state with a specific browser,
and identifying SD-URLs. The module is built on top of the
Spider crawler for OWASP ZAP [4]. The crawling considers
a URL to be part of the target site if it satisfies at least one
of three constraints: it is hosted at the target site domain, it
redirects to a URL hosted at the target site domain, or it is
part of a redirection chain involving a URL satisfying any of
the above two criterion.
Each discovered URL is visited from each input state and
using each input browser. Before visiting a URL, a state script
is executed to load the corresponding state in the browser.
The state scripts also allow collecting URLs only accessible
from authenticated states. Currently, Basta-COSI supports the
three most popular browsers: Chrome, Firefox, and Edge. For
each browser, it supports the latest version at the time we
started the implementation: Google Chrome v71.0.3578.98,
Mozilla Firefox v65.0.1, and Microsoft Edge v42.17134.1.0.
The module has a flexible design that allows adding support
for other browsers and browser versions. For each triplet
(URL, browser, state), it stores the full response (headers and
body) received from the server.
URLs that return the same response in each state are not
state-dependent and thus cannot be used in a COSI attack. To
identify if a URL is state-dependent, a similarity function is
used that compares responses ignoring non-deterministic fields
such as the Date header or CSRF tokens that may differ in
each response. URLs that return the same response (minus
non-deterministic fields) in every state are not state-dependent,
and can be discarded.
To illustrate the tool we use a running example based on
a simplified HotCRP testing with 3 state scripts: Reviewer1
(R1), Reviewer2 (R2), and LoggedOut (LO). The goal of the
analyst is to find a COSI attack that reveals the reviewer of
a specific paper. In this scenario, the tester can ignore the
administrator and author accounts since an attacker (typically
an author) would only send emails with the attack page URL
to the (non-chair) PC members. The three identified URLs
in our running example are shown in Table IV. Each table
entry shows the response for the URL when visited from a
specific state. For simplicity, each response is summarized as
a tuple of 4 field values: Status Code (sc), Content-Type (ct),
X-Frame-Options (xfo), and X-Content-Type-Options (xcto).
The URL /images/pdffx.png is not a SD-URL since it returns
the same response in all states. Thus, it will be removed at this
step. The other two URLs are state-dependent since for each
of them there exists at least one pair of states whose responses
are different.
B. Attack Vector Identification
The goal of the attack vector identification module is to
find, among all the SD-URLs discovered, the ones for which
a matching attack class is known, and thus can be used to
generate attack vectors. Basta-COSI supports all attack classes
in Table VII. Those attack classes can be split into two groups.
The first (static) group are attack classes for which it can
be determined, using solely the collected logs of HTTP(S)
responses, if a SD-URL matches the class. This group includes
all classes that capture differences in HTTP headers such as
Status Code, Content-Type, or X-Frame-Options. The second
(dynamic) group are attack classes for which matching a SD-
URL requires data difficult to obtain from the responses such
as JS errors, postMessages, and audio/video properties (e.g.,
width, height, duration). For this group, it is needed to visit
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URL Response Received at Different States
Reviewer1 (R1) Reviewer2 (R2) Logged Out (LO)
/testconf/images/pdffx.png sc = 200, ct = image/png, no
xfo, no xcto
sc = 200, ct = image/png, no
xfo, no xcto
sc = 200, ct = image/png, no
xfo, no xcto
/testconf/doc.php/hotcrpdb-paper1.pdf sc = 200, ct = application/pdf,
no xfo, xcto = nosniff
sc = 403, ct = text/html, no
xfo, no xcto
sc = 200, ct = text/html, no
xfo, no xcto
/testconf/offline.php?downloadForm=1 sc = 200, ct = text/html, no
xfo, xcto = nosniff
sc = 200, ct = text/html, no
xfo, xcto = nosniff
sc = 200, ct = text/html, no
xfo, no xcto
TABLE IV: Examples of URLs collected from HotCRP from three states. For simplicity, the response is represented with only
a subset of 4 field values: Status Code (sc), Content-Type (ct), X-Frame-Options (xfo), and X-Content-Type-Options (xcto).
the SD-URL with different inclusion methods to collect the
missing data.
For each SD-URL and pair of states that return different
responses for that SD-URL, the module first checks if there
exist any matching static attack class. For efficiency, if two dif-
ferent state pairs produce the same responses, there is no need
to query the attack classes for the second pair. We illustrate
this process using the SD-URLs in Table IV. For doc.php,
the responses from (R1, R2) match two static attack classes:
EF-StatusErrorObject, EF-StatusErrorLink. Similarly, the re-
sponses from (R2, LO) match the same two static attack
classes as (R1, R2). Finally, the states (R1, LO) match the
static attack classes EF-CtMismatchObject and EF-XctoScript.
The process repeats with the other SD-URL (offline.php).
Since states R1 and R2 return the same response, the (R1, R2)
pair can be ignored. For states (R1, LO), the attack class EF-
XctoScript matches. Finally, for states (R2, LO) the responses
are the same as for (R1, LO) and there is no need to check
them again.
In our example, all state pairs can be distinguished using
a static attack class. If that was not the case, the module
would collect additional information to check the dynamic
attack classes. For this, the SD-URL is included in a set of
data collection pages hosted at a test web server. Each page
uses an inclusion method from one of the dynamic classes
and collects the required dynamic data for the class (e.g., use
script to collect JS errors and JS readable objects). Each data
collection page is visited with each browser and from every
state that returns a unique response.
The attack vector identification module outputs, for each
pair of states, a list of pairs (SD-URL, AttackClass) specifying
that an attack vector that uses the SD-URL and the attack class
can distinguish those two states for the browsers defined by
the attack class.
C. Attack Page Generation
Given a target state st and a set of target browsers B, the
goal of the attack page generation is to produce an attack page
that distinguishes st from the other states, when visited by a
browser in B. The set of target browsers should be equal to
or a subset of the set of browsers input to Basta-COSI. This
process comprises of two steps: attack vector selection and
attack page construction.
Algorithm 1 details the attack vector selection. It selects,
among all attack vectors, the ones needed to distinguish the
target state when visited by a target browser. The algorithm
Algorithm 1: Attack vector selection
inputs : Target state st, target browsers B, states S, attack vectors A
outputs: The list of selected attack vectors
1 outVectors ← [ ];
2 Sr ← S − st;
3 Ar ← filter(A, st);
4 Ar ← mergeStates(Ar);
5 P ← (si ∈ Sr , bj ∈ B);
6 while P 6= ∅, Ar 6= ∅, s > 0 do
7 V = score(Ar, P);
8 (s,a) ← (max(V),argmax(V));
9 if s > 0 then
10 outVectors.append(a);
11 P ← P - getCoveredPairs(a);
12 Ar ← Ar − a;
13 end
14 end
15 return outVectors, P ;
first removes all attack vectors that do not include the target
state since they do not enable distinguishing st (Line 3). In our
HotCRP example, the target state is R2 and all attack vectors
for state pair (R1, LO) are removed. Then, it merges the
states of all remaining attack vectors with the same SD-URL
and attack class into a single attack vector that distinguishes
St from n ≥ 2 other states. In our example, attack vectors
(R1, R2, doc.php, EF-StatusErrorObject) and (R2, LO,
doc.php, EF-StatusErrorObject) are merged into ({R1, LO},
doc.php, EF-StatusErrorObject). Next, it initializes a set P
with all pairs of states and browsers to be distinguished (Line
5). The algorithm goes into a loop that at each iteration it
identifies the attack vector that covers most remaining pairs in
P (Lines 6-14). The loop iterates until all pairs have been
covered, no attack vectors remain, or the remaining attack
vectors do not allow distinguishing the remaining pairs. To
select an attack vector, a score function is used that assigns
higher scores to attack vectors that cover more pairs in P ,
penalizing attack classes that may interfere with other vectors
(Line 7). For example, a CSP policy for CSPViolation that
targets script resources may interfere with an EventsFired
vector that uses the script tag. If the score is zero, the
loop breaks as the remaining attack vectors do not allow
distinguishing the remaining pairs. Otherwise, the selected
attack vector is appended to the output list (Line 10), the newly
covered pairs are removed from P (Line 11), and the selected
attack vector is removed from the available list (Line 12). In
our example, the first loop iteration selects the attack vector
({R1, LO}, doc.php, EF-StatusErrorObject) as it covers
four pairs, differentiating all states for Firefox and Edge. The
next loop iteration selects attack vector ({R1, LO}, doc.php,
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EF-StatusErrorLink), which covers the two remaining pairs,
distinguishing all states for Chrome. At that point, no more
pairs remain to be covered, and the algorithm outputs the
selected attack vectors. The algorithm also outputs the pair
set P . If empty, the attack page distinguishes the target state
from all other states for all target browsers. Otherwise, some
states may not be distinguishable for some target browsers.
For each attack class, the attack page generation module
has a template to implement the attack. For each selected
attack vector, it chooses one inclusion method in the attack
class, and applies the corresponding template with the SD-
URL. All instantiated templates are integrated into the output
attack page.
V. EXPERIMENTS
This section presents the evaluation of Basta-COSI on
four open source web applications (HotCRP, GitLab, GitHub
Enterprise, OpenCart) and six popular web sites (linkedin.com,
blogger.com, amazon.com, pornhub.com, drive.google.com,
and pinterest.com). These targets were selected because
they are popular, allow us to test on white-box (open source)
and black-box (deployed) scenarios, and cover services with
multiple user states: conference management, source code
development, online shopping, privacy-sensitive site, image
sharing, and file storage. First, Section V-A describes the
results of Basta-COSI, then Section V-B details the attacks
found, and finally Section V-C analyzes the prevalence of the
postMessage attack class.
Ethics. Our testing does not target any real user of the live
sites. All testing on live sites is restricted to user accounts
that we created on those sites exclusively for this purpose.
The process of validating that the attacks found on open-
source web applications work on live installations of those
applications is similarly restricted to accounts owned by the
authors. The impact on live sites is limited to receiving a few
thousand requests for valid resources in the site. We spread
the requests over time to avoid spike loads.
We have responsibly disclosed the attacks found to the
affected web application and website maintainers. We have
received a response confirming the attacks in all cases, except
for OpenCart that has not yet replied. We avoid providing
details for attacks not yet patched. We have also reported
our results to the three browser vendors. We incorporate their
feedback into our defenses discussion in Section VI.
A. Basta-COSI Evaluation
For every target web application and site, Table V summa-
rizes the results for each tool module, as well as the COSI
attacks found. The data collection part shows the number
of input state scripts provided to Basta-COSI, the number
of URLs crawled, and the number of SD-URLs identified.
The attack vector identification part shows the total number
of attack vectors identified, the number of state pairs they
cover, and the number of XS-Leaks they use. The attack
page generation part shows the number of states uniquely
distinguished (UD) from other states, the number of states
partially distinguished (PD) excluding UD states, and the
minimum/average/maximum attack vectors in the attack pages.
Finally, the attacks found part shows the type and browsers
affected for the identified attacks.
Depending on the target, we created 3–6 state scripts to
use Basta-COSI. One script always corresponds to the logged
out (LO) state and the others are target-specific. For example,
for GitLab the other 5 states are for maintainer, developer,
reporter, guest (read-only access), and a user with no read
access to the repository. Similar to a fuzzing tool, Basta-COSI
will try to find attacks until the allocated time budget runs out.
We let Basta-COSI run for a maximum of 24 hours on each
target, although after a few hours the crawling typically does
not find any new URLs. The data collection results show that
SD-URLs are very common, on average 68% of the discovered
URLs are SD-URLs (and up to 99% in GitHub). Basta-COSI
finds between 58 and 1,364 attack vectors in each target. Those
attack vectors use between 1 and 5 XS-Leaks. Table VI details
the distribution of attack vectors per XS-Leak for each target
and browser pair. The results show that most attack vectors
correspond to EventsFired attack classes, but Basta-COSI finds
attack vectors for 5 XS-Leaks. Some states can be uniquely
identified, i.e., distinguished from any other state, and the rest
can be partially distinguished. We found no state that could
not be distinguished at all. It is important to note that partially
distinguishable states can also be used in attacks. For example,
not being able to differentiate the administrator from a normal
user does not matter if the administrator is not targeted by the
attack, i.e., not sent the attack page URL.
The summary of attacks found shows that Basta-COSI is
able to identify COSI attacks in all target applications and
sites evaluated. We manually evaluated the generated attack
pages and found no false positives. We do not evaluate false
negatives, as we lack ground truth of the COSI attacks present
in the targets. However, we acknowledge that, similar to any
testing tool, false negatives are possible, e.g., Basta-COSI can
only find COSI attacks that are a variant of the 39 attack
classes it supports. For every target, at least a login detection
attack is found that can uniquely identify the logged out state.
For 8 of the 10 targets, other types of attacks are found,
including account deanonymization attacks in 7 of the 10
targets. The attacks are detailed in the next section.
B. Description of the Attacks
This section describes the attacks Basta-COSI found. Since
login detection attacks were found for all targets, and login
detection is often a prerequisite for other attacks, we focus on
attacks targeting other states. All attacks work on the three
tested browsers, unless specifically noted.
HotCRP. Two attacks are found that allow determining
whether the victim is a reviewer of a specific paper. To launch
a reviewer deanonymization attack, the attacker collects the
email addresses of the program committee members and sends
them a spear-phishing email to convince them to click on the
attack page URL. A simplified version of the first attack is
illustrated in our running example in Section IV and leverages
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Data Collection Attack Vector Identification Attack Page Generation Attacks Found
Target SD State Leak UD PD Vectors Login Account Account Access
States URLs URLs Vectors Pairs Methods States States Min Avg Max Detcn. Type Deanon. Detcn.
HotCRP 5 68 65 116 7 3 1 4 1 1.6 3 C,E,F - C,E,F -
GitLab 6 52 19 236 14 1 2 4 1 1.9 2 C,E,F C,E,F C,E,F -
GitHub 4 91 90 992 6 1 4 0 1 1.8 2 C,E,F C,E,F C,E,F -
OpenCart 5 51 32 72 7 1 2 3 1 1.1 2 C,E,F - - -
linkedin.com 4 60 21 639 6 4 4 0 1 1.3 2 C,E,F C,E,F C,E,F E,F
blogger.com 3 17 11 180 3 5 3 0 1 1.7 2 C,E,F - C,E,F -
amazon.com 4 33 13 125 5 5 2 2 1 1 1 C,E,F - - -
pornhub.com 4 31 17 58 5 1 2 2 1 1.6 2 C,E,F - C,E,F -
drive.google.com 3 158 154 1364 3 2 3 0 1 1.4 2 C,E,F - C,E,F -
pinterest.com 3 54 52 622 3 4 3 0 1 1 1 C,E,F - - -
TABLE V: Basta-COSI evaluation results. For every target app. and site, it shows the data for each tool module, as well as
the type and browsers affected for the attacks found. Browsers are abbreviated as Chrome (C), Firefox (F), and Edge (E).
Target Browser EF OP PM CSS JSE JOR CSP
HotCRP
Chrome 56 24 0 0 0 0 0
Firefox 76 0 0 0 12 0 0
Edge 80 0 0 0 0 0 0
GitLab
Chrome 118 0 0 0 0 0 0
Firefox 236 0 0 0 0 0 0
Edge 236 0 0 0 0 0 0
GitHub
Chrome 992 0 0 0 0 0 0
Firefox 282 0 0 0 0 0 0
Edge 282 0 0 0 0 0 0
OpenCart
Chrome 24 0 0 0 0 0 0
Firefox 72 0 0 0 0 0 0
Edge 72 0 0 0 0 0 0
linkedin.com
Chrome 32 432 0 0 0 0 45
Firefox 51 432 0 0 0 0 75
Edge 94 393 0 0 0 0 113
blogger.com
Chrome 24 54 6 0 0 0 96
Firefox 24 54 6 0 0 0 88
Edge 12 54 6 0 0 0 76
amazon.com
Chrome 4 518 0 0 4 0 44
Firefox 16 518 0 0 4 0 60
Edge 12 518 0 0 4 0 69
pornhub.com
Chrome 0 58 0 0 0 0 0
Firefox 0 58 0 0 0 0 0
Edge 0 58 0 0 0 0 0
drive.google
.com
Chrome 978 197 0 0 0 0 0
Firefox 677 386 0 0 0 0 0
Edge 52 220 0 0 0 0 0
pinterest.com
Chrome 432 182 0 0 0 0 8
Firefox 148 182 0 0 0 0 0
Edge 148 182 0 0 0 0 0
(Legend: EF=EventFire; OP=ObjectProperties; PM=PostMessage; CSS=
CSSPropRead; JSE=JSError; JOR=JSObjectRead; CSP=CSPViolation)
TABLE VI: Number of attack vectors found by Basta-COSI
for each target, browser, and XS-Leak.
the URL of a paper’s PDF. This attack requires the conference
to be configured so that program committee members can only
access the PDF of papers they are reviewing. That is not a
common configuration for conferences hosted on hotcrp.com,
so this attack has limited impact. However, the second attack
bypasses this limitation using different vectors and does indeed
affect multiple conferences hosted on hotcrp.com. It has been
confirmed by the HotCRP developer and is currently being
fixed. The attack pages for each of the two attacks use 3 attack
vectors. First, it launches a login detection attack. If the victim
is logged, another attack vector determines if the victim is a
reviewer for the paper. Different attack vectors are used for
Chrome and for both Firefox and Edge.
GitLab. Attacks are found that allow determining if the victim
is the owner of a repository, or owns a snippet that stores code
and text to be shared with other users. Both attacks first use
a login detection attack. If the victim is logged in, the attack
page mounts the EventFire attack using the URL for editing
the repository settings or the snippets to detect if the victim
has administrative rights over them. Given that the username
is part of the URL of a GitLab repository, a deanonymization
attack can also be mounted.
GitHub. An attack allows distinguishing the GitHub Enter-
prise account type (administrator or normal user) by including
the URL for accessing staff tools. The other attacks are similar
to the GitLab ones, allowing to identify if the victim owns a
specific repository, or a gist (GitHub’s version of a snippet).
OpenCart. A EF-CtMisMatchScript attack is found that can
identify if the victim performed an order, provided the order
identifier (OID) is known.
LinkedIn. A CSPViolation attack allows distinguishing the
account type (free or premium) using the SD-URL https:
//www.linkedin.com/cap/. This attack has already been fixed
following our disclosure. A second attack allows determining
if the victim is the owner of a specific LinkedIn profile using
the OP-WindowProperties attack class. The underlying cause
of this attack is that the number of frames in a LinkedIn
profile page is 3 when visited by the owner of the profile,
and 4 otherwise. A third attack allows determining whether
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the victim has previously visited LinkedIn or not. This attack
only affects Firefox and Edge and could be used for targeted
advertising.
Blogger. Multiple attacks are found that enable identifying if
the victim is the owner of a specific blog, thus deanonymizing
the blog owner. Attacks are possible with different attack
classes (e.g., EF-CtMismatchScript, EF-CtMismatchObject).
The attacker needs to know the blogID of the target victim,
which can be found on the HTML source of the target blog.
Amazon. CSPViolation attacks are found that leak if the
victim is using the Amazon Kindle Direct Publishing (KDP)
service, or has accepted the KDP terms and policies. That
information could be used for targeted advertising, e.g., to
show advertisements of kindle books to the victim.
Pornhub. Attacks are found using the OP-Window-Properties
and OP-FrameCount that allow to determine if the victim is
the owner of a specific username, thus enabling deanonymiza-
tion of the account in a closed-world setting. The underlying
reason for the OP-FrameCount attack is similar to that of the
LinkedIn attack, but mounted on Pornhub’s playlist URLs.
Google Drive. Multiple ObjectProperty-based attacks are
found to identify if the victim visiting the attack page is one
among N different Google users (e.g., all the employees of a
company). For each target user, the attacker uploads a specific
resource in the attacker’s Google drive and shares it with the
corresponding user. Google drive has the option to not notify
the person with whom the resource is being shared. When a
victim visits the attack page, the attacker can determine if it
is any of the N users.
Pinterest. A CSPViolation attack can be mounted with the
Facebook SSO initiation URL for determining whether the
victim authenticated into Pinterest using its Facebook account.
A similar attack was found for Google’s SSO.
C. postMessage Attacks
Since postMessage is a novel attack class that uses a pre-
viously unknown XS-Leak, we analyze its prevalence. Basta-
COSI finds a postMessage login detection attack in Blogger.
To use it the attacker creates a private blog, only accessible to
the attacker, e.g., https://private-attacker-blog.blogspot.com.
It embeds this URL in the attack page. Other logged users are
notified that they don’t have access to this resource through
a page that uses postMessages. Instead, logged out users are
redirected to the login page, which has no postMessages.
Finding one vulnerable target out of 10 tested shows that
the attack is useful, but does not clarify its prevalence. For
this, we conducted experiments on the Alexa Top 100 sites [6].
Out of the 100 sites, only 63 supported authentication, and out
of them, 11 had a login detection attack using postMessage.
These web sites include, among others, youtube.com, reddit
.com, and ebay.com. This shows that the postMessage attack
class is prevalent in popular sites.
VI. DEFENSES AGAINST COSI ATTACKS
This section discusses existing and upcoming defenses
against COSI attacks.
SameSite cookies. COSI attacks leverage the automatic in-
clusion of HTTP cookies [15], client-side certificates [41],
and HTTP Authentication credentials [26] in requests sent
by web browsers, known as the ambient authority problem
in browsers [21]. Web sites can use the SameSite attribute
in a Cookie header to prevent the browser from sending
that cookie in cross-site requests [39], [61]. This defense
disables SD-URLs whose responses are based on states saved
in cookies. On the other hand, it does not prevent leakage by
HTTP Authentication credentials and client-side certificates, it
needs to be set for each cookie; it may be challenging to deploy
in web sites expecting legitimate cross-origin requests [52];
and its implementation in browsers can have flaws [25].
When we disclosed our results to the browser vendors, we
were told they plan to address COSI attacks by marking
all cookies by default as SameSite=Lax, unless the site
specifically disables them with SameSite=None, or makes
it stricter with SameSite=Strict [63]. This change is
already planned for Chrome [10] and Firefox [11].
Session-specific URLs. Web sites can use URLs that include
a session-specific, non-guessable, token (e.g., a query parame-
ter). The token must be cryptographically bound to the session
identifier (e.g., the hash of the identifier), and the web site
must verify this relationship for all HTTP requests. Session-
specific URLs prevent the attacker from identifying SD-URLs
for the victim’s session, avoiding COSI attacks. This defense
does not depend on browser vendors and can be deployed right
away. On the other hand, it increases complexity, may impact
performance, and the web site must ensure that the tokens
cannot be leaked or brute forced [21].
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy. An emerging HTTP response
header that allows web sites to ask browsers to disallow cross-
origin requests to specific resources [1]. The request is not
prevented, rather the browser avoids leakage by stripping the
response body. Currently supported by Chrome and Safari.
Fetch metadata. An emerging set of HTTP request headers
that send additional provenance data about a request [62], e.g.,
the HTML element triggering a cross-site request. Currently
supported by Chrome. A web site can use this information to
design policies that block potentially malicious requests. e.g.,
inclusion of a non-image resource with an img tag.
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy. There is ongoing discussion
on a new HTTP response header to prevent malicious web
sites from abusing other web sites by opening them in a
window [2]. This defense could protect against COSI attack
classes that use the window.open inclusion method (e.g. OP-
Window Properties, postMessage).
Tor Browser. The Tor Browser takes many preventive mea-
sures against timing-based COSI attacks [49]. Additionally, it
isolates the browser’s state based on the URL in the address
bar. Therefore, it does not attach cookies and Authoriza-
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Reference Year Type Attack Classes
Grossman & Hansen [32] 2006 Blog EF-CtMismatchImg
Grossman [29] 2006 Blog JSError
Shiflett [53] 2006 Blog JSError
Bortz et al. [17] 2007 Paper Timing
Grossman [30] 2008 Blog EF-CtMismatchScript
Evans [22] 2008 Blog CSSPropRead
Evans [23] 2009 Blog Timing
Cardwell [18] 2011 Blog EF-StatusErrorScript
Grossman [31] 2012 Blog EF-CtMismatchImg, OP-
FrameCount, JSObjectRead,
CSSPropRead
Homakov [36] 2013 Bug CSPViolation
Gelernter & Herzberg [27] 2015 Paper Timing
Goethem et al. [58] 2015 Paper Timing, EF-CtMismatchVideo
Lekies et al. [45] 2015 Paper JSObjectRead
Lee et al. [42] 2015 Paper AppCacheError
Schwenk et al. [51] 2017 Paper OP-LinkSheet
Masas [47] 2018 Blog OP-WindowProperties
Shift-js [9] 2018 Blog CSPViolation
Gulyas et al. [34] 2018 Paper CSPViolation
Staicu & Pradel [55] 2019 Paper EF-CtMismatchImg
Masas [50] 2019 Blog OP-WindowProperties
XSLeaks [59] 2019 Project EF-CtMismatchImg, OP-
FrameCount, CSPViolation,
Timing, EF-CtMismatchObject,
OP-ImgDimension, OP-
MediaDuration, OP-
WindowProperties, EF-
CacheLoadCheck
TABLE VII: Summary of previously proposed COSI attacks
tion header values to cross-origin HTTP requests generated
by inclusions using HTML tags. However, the state isolation
is not enforced for the window.open method, so authentication
headers are still attached to HTTP requests generated using
this inclusion method. Therefore, Tor Browser users are still
vulnerable to the new postMessage attack class we discovered.
VII. RELATED WORK
Prior COSI attack instances. Table VII summarizes the
20 prior works proposing COSI attack instances. The first
instance we have identified of a COSI attack was proposed in
2006 by Grossman and Hansen [32]. It was a login detection
attack using the img tag and the EventsFired XS-Leak (EF-
CtMismatchImg attack class). Since then, EventFired attacks
have been shown to apply to other HTML tags and content
types [18], [30], [31], [59]. Recently, Staicu and Pradel [55]
showed that EventsFired attacks can be combined with share-
able images to deanonymize users of image sharing services.
In another blog post in 2006, Grossman [29] introduced the
first instance of the JSError attack class that leverages the
type and line number of errors triggered when a JavaScript
resource is included using the script tag. This attack was then
demonstrated on popular sites like Amazon [53]. Inspired by
Grossman’s attacks, Evans [22] presented the first instance
of the CSSPropRead attack class, leveraging the presence of
certain objects and variables from an included JS resource.
In a 2012 post Grossman presented multiple attack instances
including the first instances of the JSObjectRead attack class
and the first attack using the readable object properties XS-
Leak. Lekies et al. [45] extended the JSObjectRead class with
more techniques such as prototype tampering and showed that
JSObjectRead attacks can be defended by making the URLs
of script files unpredictable and including JS parser-breaking
strings in dynamic JS files. After Grossman’s initial attack
using the FrameCount readable object property, instances
of attack classes leveraging other properties (e.g., window
frame count, width, height, duration, cssRules) have been
proposed [47], [50], [51], [59].
Homakov [36], [37] showed that cross-origin and sub-
domain redirections can be detected by abusing CSP. This
approach has been used for login detection and fingerprinting
attacks [9], [34]. Recently, Staicu et al. [55] show that a
deanonymization attack can be mounted using images up-
loaded to GitHub. Our attacks on GitHub leverage instead
non-image resources.
Bortz et al. [17] showed that the timing of the events fired
when a resource is loaded using the img HTML tag is a
good metric to determine the state of a user at a target site.
Evans [23] and Gelernter and Herzberg [27] applied similar
approaches for mounting cross-site search attacks. Goethem et
al. [58] showed that the parsing time of the included resources
is a better alternative and that the Referer and Origin
headers can help preventing such attacks.
In this work, beyond surveying prior works presenting attack
instances, we have introduced the concept of attack classes
to generalize attack instances, discovered new COSI attack
classes, built a tool to identify COSI attacks against a target
site, and discussed possible defenses.
Browser history sniffing attacks. Multiple works have stud-
ied history sniffing attacks that use browser side channels to
determine whether a user has accessed certain web sites [19],
[24], [48], [54], [64]. To defend against history sniffing attacks
Jackson et al. proposed to increase the isolation of different
origins [38] and Wondracek et al. proposed adding non-
predictable tokens in URLs and using the POST method [64].
History sniffing attacks are similar to COSI attacks in lever-
aging a browser side channel, but fundamentally differ in the
absence of a target site and in that the attack page does not
send cross-origin requests.
Attacks using postMessage. Guan et al. [33] analyzed privacy
issues in postMessages broadcasted by popular web sites and
Stock et al. showed that usage of broadcasted postMessages
has been increasing [56]. Our postMessage COSI attacks
leverage differences between broadcasted postMessages in SD-
URLs and do not require that they contain sensitive data.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented COSI attacks as a comprehensive cat-
egory and performed their first systematic study. We have
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introduced the concept of COSI attack classes to capture
related attack variants and have identified 39 COSI attack
classes, of which 22 are new, and the rest generalize existing
attack instances. We have discovered a novel browser XS-
Leak based on window.postMessage. We have designed a novel
approach to detect COSI attacks, and implemented it into
Basta-COSI, the first tool to detect COSI attacks. Basta-COSI
identifies SD-URLs in a target web site, tests if those SD-
URLs can be attacked using any of the 39 attack classes, and
produces attack pages that demonstrate the existence of COSI
attacks to distinguish different states. We have applied Basta-
COSI to test four popular stand-alone web applications and
six popular live sites, finding COSI attacks against all of them
with no false positives. Finally, we have discussed defenses
against COSI attacks.
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